Journal of APPLIED RESEARCH IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Progressive thought and action for practitioners, researchers, civic leaders,
and other citizens contributing to the regional economic development process
Lessons of Disaster:
Policy Change After Catastrophic Events
Georgetown University Press
2006 / 240 pp. / $26.95
Reviewed by
In Birkland’s 1997 book, After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public Policy, and Focusing Events, he examined how disasters affect agendas and the interactions among the event, the nature of the event and the community of actors who address the policy issues or problems illuminated by the event. Its focus was on agenda changes subsequent to disasters. Lessons of Disaster: Policy Change After Catastrophic Events expands on After the Disaster by looking at the extent of policy change (not just agenda change) following a disaster.
The difference between agenda changes after a disaster and policy changes after a disaster is akin to the difference between thinking about something differently and doing something differently. Doing something differently is the crux of what Birkland explores in Lesson of Disaster: Policy Change After Catastrophic Events.
In this very readable, timely and relevant book, Birkland sets the stage for examining significant disasters and the subsequent policy changes indicative of institutional lesson learning (e.g., 9/11 in the context of homeland security and aviation security; earthquakes; and hurricanes). Hurricane Katrina is woven throughout as illustrative of what went right in lesson learning and what could go better. This book will be a valuable resource to those studying or advocating policy changes in response to catastrophic events.
Two overarching assumptions are reflected throughout. The first is the normative view that “…citizens expect government and other officials to learn from disasters and to prevent repeat disasters, or at least to prevents repeat mistakes in response to disasters” (p 29).The second interwoven assumption is that “…natural hazards are national problems but that local governments are best able to respond and take steps to mitigate them” (p129).
Building upon a careful analysis of extensive data (from before and after) about the 9/11 attack, Hurricane Katrina and other disasters, Birkland concludes that natural disasters do not normally lead to direct policy change in the way that they have in aviation and homeland security.
For natural disasters, the learning is cumulative. They do not seem to have much power to change policy because few groups mobilize in response to an event and explicitly lobby for policy change at the federal level. This is exacerbated by the almost overwhelming need to attend to relief and mitigation. Birkland opines that there must certainly be learning occurring due to natural disasters, but he finds no direct relationship between these disasters and improved policy.
In contrast, he finds that most of the learning (albeit unimplemented) related to 9/11 to have occurred prior to the precipitous event. He explains that the astonishingly fast policy changes implemented post 9/11 were based on lessons and knowledge already known and widely reported within the homeland security community. This is offered as the basis for a quick policy response to 9/11. For example, it was widely known that aviation and other infrastructure systems in the U.S. were vulnerable prior to the attack. The lessons that needed to be implemented had been bandied about, discussed, picked apart and put back together among a wide audience in the security community, including recommendations for most of what was implemented post 9/11. What this disaster provided was the attention, outcry and political resolve to implement changes.
The details of Birkland’s analysis include an initial section setting the stage for his detailed analysis. This is where he establishes the foundation. The exploration of the difference between agenda change and policy change is preceded by an illuminating and clear section defining and illustrating terms, what each of these areas of thought include and why, with examples, and an interesting model of event-related policy learning (see below from p18).
Birkland’s model is crafted to communicate meaningful information about the policy process and suggest explanations for public policy, along with being no more complex than necessary. He uses his model to offer six propositions about what might be seen in the policy process in domains prone to disaster.
1. The first of these propositions is that most participants in a policy domain want to address or solve the problems illuminated by a focusing event, though these problems vary with the interests and motivations of the differing participants.
2. Only a few events will get the most attention. The example offered for this proposition is that there are many tropical storms and hurricanes that make landfall, very few of which will get significant attention and have the greatest potential for learning and policy change (e.g., hurricanes Andrew and Katrina).
3. Group mobilization is linked to a specific focusing event.
4. Group mobilization will cause, or be associated with, an increase in policy discussion, including theories about the causes and potential solutions.
5. There is a relationship between ideas and policy change. Specifically, policy change is more likely when ideas rise to significant awareness after events. Birkland offers that while policy change can occur in the absence of ideas, this kind of change is not the result of careful debate and consideration and therefore any change absent well discussed and thought through ideas, it isn’t the result of learning.
6. The final proposition offered via Birkland’s model is that it is possible for learning to degrade or decay over time. This is the expression of the colloquial concept that it’s best to strike while the iron is hot. Policy makers tend to forget the lessons they learned if too much time passes after the focusing event prior to policy change implementation.
The analysis of the book focuses on three major events or event types, including: learning from September 11, 2001; learning from aviation security disasters; and, learning from earthquakes and hurricanes.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were followed by blazingly fast policy changes, many put in place via federal legislation just 45 days after the event and implemented immediately. Birkland reports that unlike previous terrorist attacks, the studies, reports and supporting testimony occurred after most of the policy changes made in response to the attacks, including the Gilmore Commission and the Hart-Rudman Commission. Even though the rapid and far reaching policy changes implemented immediately after September 11, 2001 appear to be evidence that learning occurred as a result of this focusing event, Birkland argues that there is little evidence to suggest that this event triggered any real policy innovation. In other words, this focusing event resulted in implementing changes encompassing previously known problems and discussed solutions.
The 9/11 learning event is contrasted with other historical U.S. aviation disasters, including the highjackings of the 1970s up to 9/11 (including particularly Pan Am 103 and TWA 800). The detail and analysis in this section is interesting and insightful. Birkland concludes this area with the observation that there appears to be “…prima facie evidence of instrumental and social learning from the September 11 attacks and lesser evidence of learning after earlier attacks” (p101).
Turning to earthquakes and hurricanes we find some telling differences that might explain why the learning subsequent to these disaster types is so different from the 9/11 catastrophe. Learning from natural disasters is incremental and isn’t of much interest to public officials and organizations beyond the extent of the disaster. Those that are affected by the disaster are nearly overwhelmed by the cry for and task of relief and mitigation. Little time or resources are available for the thoughtful policy discussions and debate required to formulate ideas necessary for policy change to occur. Another major difference observed is that of the significant event-related differences between earthquake events and hurricane events. This may be related to the paucity of earthquake change advocacy groups. Only one was found by Birkland. This section contains an interesting look at the reward factors, such as the moral hazard apparently created by the National Flood Insurance Program, which has been ineffective in reducing damage while it appears to encourage individuals to take risks they might otherwise not if flood insurance were priced according to cost rather than being federally subsidized. Other interesting angles considered are the political benefits of immediate and plentiful disaster relief compared to the apparent low value to politicians and public of mitigation measures.
Birkland nicely wraps a bow around all the preceding detail and analysis in the concluding section, including a clear section rehearsing factors that promote and inhibit learning. Additionally, he offers clear signposts for future work, suggesting two important research questions for the future. The first is whether social policy learning must precede instrumental policy learning. The second is whether social policy lessons lead policy makers to prefer one solution over another.
I enjoyed reading Lessons of Disaster: Policy Change After Catastrophic Events, finding it an engaging and thought provoking read. I found the initial tutorial-like explanation at the beginning and the proposed model an excellent framework to ponder the subsequent facts, analysis and conclusion sections. Who will find it interesting and of value? Those charged with long term preparation and response to disasters will find it helpful in understanding the factors influencing policy change subsequent to disaster. Additionally, it will be helpful to those in this group when formulating a systematic argument and plan of approach for advocating needed policy change.
The reviewer
Rick C. Crowsey is lead geographic researcher at Crowsey Incorporated and PhD student at the University of Southern Mississippi. For 13 years he has conducted forensic and civil geographic investigations, including hurricane, oil spill, explosion, flood, maritime, rail and other disasters. He served at the invitation of the Secretary of the Interior on the national imagery archive advisory committee; was invited by USGS to advise on EDC’s move to digital delivery; and is a long-time advocate of spatial information use in court. Rick earned a BS (imaging science) from Rochester Institute of Technology, an MS (systems management) from the University of Denver and expects to earn a PhD in geography in 2011. Rick married his college sweetheart, has two children, is a certified scuba diver, and a certified private pilot. Prior to founding Crowsey Incorporated, Rick helped grow the spatial information industry as technology manager on NASA’s Commercial Remote Sensing Program.
LATEST ISSUE:
vol 6, no 1, 2009
Click & log in for FULL TEXT & ENHANCED
ONLINE VERSIONS of articles from
the current issue: available to
C2ER & SEDC members and
ARED subscribers
Click here for EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES
from the current issue: available to
all readers
About ARED & its
editorial board
Call for papers &
author guidelines
Immediate past issue:
Vol. 5, no. 3, 2008
TOURISM & E.D.
SPECIAL ISSUE
Available to all readers
Contact us: click on logos or emails below
Mark M. Miller, editor
Economic Development
The University of Southern
Mississippi
Email: mmm4ed@gmail.com
Homepage
Judson Edwards,
managing editor
Troy University
jcedwards@troy.edu
