Catalyst: A Multidisciplinary Review of Undergraduate Scholarship

U.S. v. Booker and Its Ramifications on the Use of Federal Sentencing Guidelines in the Criminal Justice System

Christopher Hare

Earlier this year, the Supreme Court announced its ruling in the case United States v. Booker, a decision that invalidated a section of the federal sentencing guidelines. Although the Court’s ruling received little national interest or media, many legal scholars such as Marc Miller argue that “[t]his is one of the most important decisions involving practical effects in the criminal justice system in United States history. It ranks up there with Miranda” (qtd. in Richey, par. 5). Indeed, U.S. v. Booker has effectively ended the process by which convicted criminals have been sentenced throughout the past 18 years and will require that the judicial system and Congress create new guidelines from the ground up.

“...many legal scholars such as Marc Miller argue that “[t]his is one of the most important decisions involving practical effects in the criminal justice system in United States history.... ”

The United States Sentencing Guidelines were designed and implemented in November of 1987 by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, a task force overseen by Congress. Amid much controversy and criticism, these guidelines established automatic, minimum sentences for certain crimes and mandated the use of a matrix to factor the circumstances of the crime into the punishment. A defendant’s guilty plea would equate to a reduced sentence, while the defendant’s use of a lethal weapon would result in a harsher punishment. In the case of U.S. v. Booker, Freddie Booker was sentenced by a jury to between 210 and 262 months in prison for two drug-trafficking offenses. However, the judge increased this sentence to 360 months (30 years) because he insisted that Freddie Booker had perjured himself while testifying and because Mr. Booker had a number of prior convictions—23 in all.

The U.S. Sentencing Commission has stated that these pre-Booker guidelines accomplish much-needed reforms in the criminal justice system: establishing honesty, unifFebruary 9, 2007 2:56 PM>9, 2007 2:35 PMlines transfer power from juries to judges, where the Constitution mandates it should be placed and that it requires minimum sentences be imposed even in cases where the punishment is disproportionate to the crime. Some critics have even gone so far as to charge that it saps moral judgment from the process of punishment (Luna 2). Most importantly, from a Constitutional standpoint, the former U.S. Sentencing Guidelines permitted judges to enhance the defendant’s sentence based on facts that were not determined by a jury, but established in the sentencing phase with a reduced burden of proof for the prosecution.

It was largely this fact—that a criminal sentence could be increased without a jury finding— that led the majority in U.S. v. Booker to rule that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines violated a defendant’s right to a trial by jury—a right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. This was the precedent set by another recent case, Blakely v. Washington, 2004, in which the Court ruled that only facts proven to a jury may be used to increase a defendant’s sentence. As Justice Scalia noted in Blakely v. Washington: Our commitment to Apprendi in this context reflects not just respect for longstanding precedent but the need to give intelligible content to the right of jury trial. That right is no mere procedural formality but a fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure. Just as suffrage ensures the people’s ultimate control in the legislative and executive branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the judiciary.

“Since the January 12th ruling, there have been hundreds of appeals filed from those who had been sentenced using the federal sentencing guidelines, and it is clear that Booker will have both a short and long-term impact on the legal system.”

Justice Scalia’s opinion in Blakely echoes the majority’s opinion in Booker that the jury and its findings are central to the determination of a defendant’s sentence. This is hardly a revolutionary concept, as many Constitutional scholars agree that “[t]he right to a trial by jury is deeply embedded in the American democratic ethos” (Hans and Vidmar 31). However, while the Court ruled that the mandatory federal sentencing guidelines are unconstitutional, it left the door open for the current sentencing guidelines to be used as advisory to sentencing.

Nonetheless, the Booker decision has left the mandatory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, one of the most important components of the criminal justice system for nearly two decades, in, at the very least, serious question. Since the January 12 ruling, there have been hundreds of appeals filed from those who had been sentenced using the federal sentencing guidelines, and it is clear that Booker will have both a short- and long-term impact on the legal system. First, it will be necessary for prosecutors to include more detail in their indictments and establish facts more relevant to the sentencing phase during the trial (Richey, par. 12). It is also probable that there will be a radical overhaul, if not a replacement, of the U.S. Sentencing Commission and U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which have been harshly criticized throughout their 18-year life span. Many legal scholars object to the mandatory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines not only because of the Constitutional questions they raise but also because of what is perceived by many to be their impractical and sometimes unjust nature:

[T]he Guidelines are too rigid and too harsh and too often force judges and lawyers to choose between imposing sentences that are wisely perceived as unjust or trying to achieve just results by means of hypocritical circumventions. Judges are forced to choose between their obligation to do justice and their obligation to enforce the law. Many judges resent having so often to make that choice (Tonry 359).

The question of whether Booker will be a remedy for the ills of the federal sentencing guidelines or not, along with the other possible ramifications of the decision, remains to be seen. However, it is abundantly clear that change is most certainly in store for the way in which defendants are tried and sentenced in federal court.

References

Clarkson, Chris, and Rod Morgan, eds. The Politics of Sentencing Reform. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Hans, Valerie, and Neil Vidmar. Judging the Jury. New York: Plenum Press, 19February 9, 2007 2:56 PM of Federal Sentencing.” Policy Analysis No. 458 (2002). 22 January 2005 .

Richey, Warren. “Court Orders Changes in Sentencing.” The Christian Science Monitor 13 January 2005. 22 January 2005 .

Tonry, Michael. “Salvaging the Sentencing Guidelines in Seven Easy Steps.” Federal Sentencing Reporter 4 (1992): 359.

Christopher Hare is a freshman from Long Beach, Mississippi. He is majoring in political science with an emphasis in public law and minoring in history. His primary academic interest is constitutional law, in which he would like to pursue a career. Chris coaches a local high school mock trial team and is also a lifelong Golden Eagles fan.